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Abstract: How should one explain the relative disappearance of a major preoc-
cupation of English-speaking Analytical Philosophy in the late 1950s/early 1960s:
an anti-essentialist response to the question, ‘What is art?’, typified in papers by
Kennick and Weitz? Minimally, anti-essentialism denies the widely-held assump-
tion that something must be in common between all the instances where (in our
case) the term “[fine] art” or the concept art is rightly ascribed, in virtue of which
all are called ‘art’; a stronger version urges that, in fact, there is no essence to (our
example) art.
With counter-arguments typically not forthcoming, Carroll (2000) mentions
both Danto’s institutionalism and Mandelbaum’s assault on the notion of fam-
ily resemblance, to explain the slackening of concern for such neo-Wittgensteinian
issues. Consideration of the actual arguments by Kennick and Weitz highlights
their unjustified dependence on Waismann’s notion of open texture, where recog-
nizing a clearer application of Wittgenstein’s ideas retains that central, if minimal,
anti-essentialist thrust for Kennick and Weitz, thereby returning this issue to the
forefront of aesthetic theorizing.
I
From time to time the memory of philosophical aesthetics must be recharged
through a reconsideration of its roots. In the ‘Introduction’ to Theories of
Art Today, Carroll addresses the relative disappearance from both JAAC and
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BJA of what had been a major preoccupation in English-speaking Analytical
Philosophy in the late 1950s and early 1960s: namely, an anti-essentialist
response to the question, ‘What is art?’, with papers by Kennick1 and Weitz2
perhaps the most famous.3
How did the situation Carroll accurately described come about? What
does it mean for contemporary philosophical aesthetics? The disappearance
from the mainstream of such apparently important sets of arguments rarely
permits clear and uncontentious explanation. Certainly that disappearance
seemed not to reflect the prevalence of major counter-arguments. But, with
some unpicking, Carroll’s conjectures might offer some consensus; I follow
him in taking as my examples these papers by Kennick and Weitz.
Carroll calls the views under discussion ‘neo-Wittgensteinian’, explicitly
claiming that both Weitz and Kennick attempted ‘. . . to demonstrate that a
definition of art (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) was impossi-
ble’, implicatingWittgenstein’s discussion of ‘games’,4 its resolution deploying
(in some way) the notion of ‘family resemblance’.5 This ‘neo-Wittgensteinian’
title has some justice: Weitz explicitly quotes Philosophical Investigations and
uses the expression ‘family resemblance’;6 Kennick merely mentions Wittgen-
stein, recognising his own deployment of that expression as ‘. . . to torture a
phrase of Wittgenstein’s’.7 However, both Kennick8 explicitly and Weitz by
allusion employ the idea of open texture, derived from Waismann, and treated
as somehow equivalent to Wittgenstein’s thoughts on family resemblance –
even though open texture was rightly acknowledged as Kneale’s translation of
Waismann’s coining;9 Waismann’s debt was to some prior writing by Wittgen-
stein.10
Carroll remarks that the ‘neo-Wittgensteinian belief . . . that art cannot
be defined . . . [was] soon contested’, initially citing two such forces of con-
testation.11 The first comes from Arthur Danto’s ‘The Artworld’12 as Carroll
acknowledges,13 in that work Danto appeared to argue ‘. . . that artworks have
at least one necessary condition – that they be enfranchised by art theories’;
since then, Danto has defended two or, arguably, three.14 As I remember the
situation only a few years later, Danto’s explicit essentialism was not stressed:
his primary insight was taken to be his emphasis on ‘confusable counter-part’
objects (read, at the time, as anti-essentialist), undermining the commitment
to many characteristics typically thought shared by artworks, by showing how
non-art ‘real things’ might also share those characteristics.15 Such ideas point
away from characteristics or properties of art of the kinds discussed by Weitz
and Kennick, characteristics central to anti-essentialist critiques.
Second, more specifically, Mandelbaum urged that the charges laid by
anti-essentialist writings, and especially their (supposed) deployment of ‘fam-
ily resemblance’, could be met.16 In Mandelbaum’s view, ‘. . . family resem-
blances, properly so-called, are governed by conditions’:17 indeed, that ‘[i]t
is a necessary condition of authentic family resemblances that they require
a genetic foundation’.18 Yet then, taking ‘. . . the family resemblance analogy
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seriously . . . would incur a reversion to the project of defining art’.19 And
Mandelbaum’s arguments were central to the justification offered for the at-
tempted definition(s) of ‘art’ by George Dickie,20 in taking Mandelbaum’s
idea of ‘unexhibited properties’ to offer ‘. . . the possibility that the relevant
features for defining art might not be manifest at all, but rather underlying,
non-manifest properties’.21 Even those actively contesting Dickie’s putative
definition(s) appear to have adopted this aspect of his project, seemingly
showing the anti-essentialist considerations to lack power. Typical responses
assumed this outcome, rather than rehearsing it – actual arguments were not
considered.
While neither conjecture alone explains the relative disappearance of the
anti-essentialist arguments, taken together they suggest how these argumen-
tative strategies might be set aside, largely without due consideration. As
Carroll comments, the net effect has been that ‘[s]ince the early nineties
(and perhaps earlier), interest in the question ‘What is art?’ has slackened
somewhat’.22 But the anti-essentialist insight was fundamental in philosophy
(especially in aesthetics), so this ‘slackening’ was mistaken; and recognising
this sheds light on others implicated in Carroll’s account.
Here, I begin by sketching the version of essentialism under considera-
tion, and outlining the views of first Kennick (§III) and then Weitz (§IV),
before commenting both on their arguments and on their (differential) de-
pendence on Waismann and, especially, Wittgenstein (§V). Then I suggest
why the setting-aside of their concerns is neither explained by the arguments
standardly used nor warranted in its own right (§VI).
II
Since these writers from the 1950s are rightly described as ‘anti-essentialist’,
exactly what conclusions count as ‘anti-essentialist’? Minimally, an anti-
essentialist denies the widely-held assumption that there must be something
in common between all the instances where one rightly ascribes (in our case)
the term ‘[fine] art’ or the concept art, something in virtue of which one
calls them all ‘art’. Anti-essentialists oppose this assumption of essentialism,
denying that ‘. . . there must be something in common to them all, or we should
not call them by the same name’.23 Here one might with profit distinguish
two versions of the anti-essentialist claim:24 one denies that it is necessary for
artworks to have something in common (besides being called ‘artworks’); the
other denies that it is necessary for artworks to have some essence in common,
of the sort that might be captured by a definition: that is, by non-circular
necessary and sufficient conditions. But, for Kennick at least, these clearly
amount to the same thing. Indeed, Kennick quotes, as a stalking horse, just
such an assumption from De Witt Parker:
. . . there is some mark or set of marks which, if it applies to any
work of art, applies to all works of art, and to nothing else – a
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common denominator . . . which constitutes the definition of art,
and serves to separate . . . the field of art from other fields of human
culture.25
The ‘common denominator’ here is just what is meant by the term ‘essence’,
and such essences are identified with a set of conditions individually neces-
sary and jointly sufficient. And rightly, for, after all, they were supposed
(by, for example, De Witt Parker) to provide ‘the definition of art’. Then,
in a sub-heading, Kennick urges that one should ‘question’ the tempting as-
sumption of such an essence or common denominator (the kind a genuine
definition might identify).26 Further, granting that no such essence is needed
may explain why this minimal anti-essentialism might rightly be confused
with the view, above, that artworks need have in common nothing but be-
ing called ‘artworks’. For our anti-essentialists are contesting the account of
concept-use whereby a justification for the use of a particular term (here,
‘art’) is required – in effect, they are responding to the well-known view of
Bell (quoted below) that to use that term with no such common denominator
is to ‘gibber’!27 But, they urge, no such ‘common denominator’ or essence is
needed.
Then, a stronger version of anti-essentialism argues that, as a matter of
fact, there is no essence to (in our case) art: both Kennick and Weitz endorse
this version of anti-essentialism explicitly, perhaps in addition to the other.
Thus Kennick (1965: 21) dismisses searching for essences (for art at least) as
‘. . . a mistake’; while Weitz urges that ‘[a]rt . . . has no set of necessary and
sufficient properties . . . [So] . . . [a]esthetic theory tries to define what cannot
be defined in the requisite sense’.28 And both endorse Waismann’s claim that
‘art’ is an open concept or has open texture: Kennick conjectures that the
problem arises from ‘. . . the systematic vagueness of the concepts in ques-
tion, or what Dr Waismann . . . has called their “open texture”;29 a vagueness
. . . which all the definitions of the aestheticians can do nothing at all to re-
move’, thereby granting to of such putative definitions an ‘. . . essential incom-
pleteness’;30 while Weitz echoes the claim by Waismann that ‘. . . definitions
of open concepts are always corrigible and emendable’31 in explaining an open
concept as one whose ‘. . . conditions of application are always emendable and
corrigible’;32 and identifying ‘. . . a logically vain attempt . . . to conceive the
concept of art as closed when its very use reveals and demands its openness’.33
Explained that way, concepts with open texture (or open concepts) lack an
essence in the relevant sense; as such, genuine definitions of them will be im-
possible. Hence acknowledging the lack of a definition is not a step additional
to identifying such open-ness. Then, further, Weitz stresses that, since art’s
‘. . . ever-present changes and novel creations . . .makes it logically impossible
to ensure any set of defining properties’, the concept ‘art’ is especially open.34
For Kennick, the anti-essentialist project is characterised as demonstrat-
ing:
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. . . that the search for essences in aesthetics is a mistake, aris-
ing from a failure to appreciate the complex but not mysterious
logic of such words and phrases as ‘art’, ‘beauty’, ‘the aesthetic
experience’, and so on.35
Yet Kennick lays out fully the remainder of a project shared with Weitz,
by recognising:
If the search for the common denominator of all works of art is
abandoned, abandoned with it must be the attempt to derive the
criteria of critical appreciation and appraisal from the nature of
art. . . . Traditional aesthetics mistakenly supposes that responsi-
ble criticism is impossible without a set of rules, canons, or stan-
dards applicable to all works of art.36
It is a short step to see what, say, Kennick finds valuable here for, if
art has no essence or nature, appeal to such an essence cannot ground art-
criticism. He identifies the assumption under criticism as the (mistaken)
idea that ‘responsible criticism is impossible without standards or criteria
universally applicable to all works of art’:37 instead, ‘[c]riticism has in no
way been hampered by the absence of generally applicable canons and norms
. . . ’.38 Then Bell’s claim that ‘art is Significant Form’ (for instance) is really
an attempt to guide appreciation, functioning positively to change taste at
the time. For Bell’s discovery was ‘. . . a new way of looking at pictures’,
directing attention to features of Cézanne as against features of the descriptive
painting of the time, typified by Frith’s Paddington Station.39 Like Kennick,
Weitz aims ‘. . . to reassess . . . [theorizing’s] role and its contribution in order
to show that it is of the greatest importance to our understanding of the
arts’.40 For both, then, are concerned to defend the possibility of art-criticism,
despite the anti-essentialist conclusion. Of course, ‘[a]ny critical judgement,
to be justified, must be supported by reasons . . . ’.41 But, since this does not
require ‘ . . . general rules, standards, canons, or laws, applicable to all works
of art by which alone such [art-critical] criteria can be supported’, future
aesthetic theories for the arts need no longer regarded as definitions; and,
hence, not as failed definitions.42 However, our concerns in anti-essentialism
mean that such issues can be set aside here.
III
Why might one think that art lacks an essence? What considerations are set
aside here? Both Kennick and Weitz begin from the failure of aesthetics to
date to find any such essence for art: ‘[i]f nothing else does, the history of
aesthetics itself should give one enormous pause here . . . [since] . . . we seem
no nearer our goal today than we were in Plato’s time’;43 indeed ‘no such
definition has been found . . . ’ despite ‘. . . all the fruitless scrutinising that
has already been done’ in the search for an essence or definition.44
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An example (at least for visual art) is provided by Bell’s essentialist as-
sertion that ‘. . . either all works of visual art have some common quality, or
when we speak of ‘works of art’ we gibber’; and his conclusion that “‘Signifi-
cant Form” is the one quality common to all works of visual art’.45 With no
independent grip on that notion, what possible help is Bell’s conclusion?
To show that nothing of the form assumed (or on offer) could be helpful,
Kennick offers what is, in fact, the centre of his argument here – his famous
‘warehouse example’:
Imagine a very large warehouse filled with all sorts of things –
pictures of very description, musical scores for symphonies and
dances and hymns, boats, houses, churches and temples, vases,
books of poetry and prose, furniture and clothing, newspapers,
postage stamps, flowers, trees, stones and musical instruments.
Now we instruct someone to enter the warehouse and bring out
all the works of art it contains. He will be able to do this with
reasonable success, despite the fact that . . . he possesses no satis-
factory definition of Art in terms of some common denominator,
because no such definition has yet been found.46
What could this example show? First, an account of art like (say) Bell’s
cannot really resolve the practical plight of the person required to enter the
warehouse. Of course, such a person would not be 100% successful in bringing
out all and only artworks: probably some artworks would be left behind, and
some decorative objects that are not art brought out, while any ‘confusable
counterpart’ cases doubtless remain puzzling. Still, the instruction seems
intelligible: ‘. . . we are able to separate those objects which are works of art
from those which are not because we know English . . . [even though] . . . no
such definition [of “art”] has yet been found’.47
But, second, the best conclusion from that argument is that any putative
definition (exemplified by Bell on Significant Form) is no better than simply
relying on one’s pre-theoretical intuitions about art. Thus Kennick stresses
the comparative uselessness of any putative definition, expressly borrowing,
and redrafting, a sentence from Waismann:
If anyone is able to use the word ‘art’ or the phrase ‘work of
art’ correctly, in all sorts of contexts and on the right sorts of
occasions, he knows ‘what art is’, and no formula in the world
can make him wiser.48
A person with a typical (passing?) experience of art ‘. . . knows a work of
art when he sees one, but has little or no idea what to look for when he is
told to bring an object that possesses Significant Form’ (Kennick, 1965: 6).
So our person, typically puzzled, would fare no better asked to bring out,
say, all the objects with Significant Form. Kennick makes a slightly stronger
claim, perhaps overstating the case:
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. . . the notion of Significant Form is clearly more obscure than is
that of Art or Beauty, as the example of the warehouse . . . amply
illustrates; the same holds for Expression, Intuition, Representa-
tion, and all the other favoured candidates of the aestheticians.49
So, if the instruction to bring objects with Significant Form from the
warehouse is no better than that to bring out the artworks (especially if many
works of recent art are included: urinals, snowshovels), must it be worse?
At best, the example indicates only that these other concepts (with Bell’s
‘Significant Form’ the primary example) do not provide more grasp on the
identification of artworks than our understanding of art. But perhaps a defi-
nition of art is not needed, since we can manage as well without these putative
definitions, even though we have no such definition (a fact supported by the
continuing search for such a definition). That conclusion accords with our
earlier weaker anti-essentialism: the thesis is not (or not necessarily) that
there is no such essence, but rather that one has no justification for assuming
there must be one. Moreover, from the perspective of identifying artworks, a
definition in terms of hidden characteristics, characteristics we did not know,
fares no better than no definition at all.
Yet can one infer, with Kennick, that the person ‘. . . possesses no sat-
isfactory definition of Art’ from the fact that ‘no such definition has been
found’?50 Focusing on the practical role played by such a definition in, in
this case, identifying artworks, the inference seems warranted – he can hardly
have a definition aesthetics lacks! But we must be careful here with what
people do or do not know. As we will see (§VI), the sort of ‘enfranchisement
by art theories’ that, for Carroll, appeared as ‘. . . at least one necessary con-
dition’ for artworks in Danto (1964/1989) might be accommodated in some
less explicit way.51 Yet, thus far, much in Kennick is at least consistent with
a defence of the weaker anti-essentialism identified above, where the issue is a
wholly general one – against the assumption that there must be such essences.
However, when Kennick urges that ‘[t]he trouble lies not in the works of
art themselves but in the concept of Art’, does he really think the concept
of art is special in this way?52 Or is he merely reflecting the context of his
discussion? For Waismann, open-ness is warranted by ‘. . . the essential in-
completeness of an empirical description’, such that ‘. . . it is always possible
to extend the description by adding some detail or other’.53 For ‘[e]very de-
scription stretches . . . into a horizon of open possibilities’.54 Then no genuine
definition will be possible for any concept with open texture, since ‘. . . no
definition of an empirical term will cover all possibilities’.55 And Waismann
specifically mentions, as ‘closed’ in this sense, concepts from mathematics
where one ‘. . . could construct a complete definition, i.e. a thought model
which anticipates and settles once for all every possible question of usage’.56
If some concepts are open, others not, Kennick could align art with some other
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concepts, but not all, in drawing attention to the open-ness of the concept art.
Yet why should such ‘open-ness’ apply to art? And what exactly justifies his
confidence in ‘. . . the essential incompleteness of an empirical description’?57
IV
If Kennick’s view is as sketched above, how should we characterise that of
Weitz? More emphatically than Kennick, he claims that art ‘. . . has no set
of necessary and sufficient properties’; and, although speaking chiefly of open
concepts, his allegiance to Waismann and to open texture is explicit.58 He
offers no specific reasons of his own for doubting the possibility of an essence:
rather, having presented a version of Wittgenstein’s account, Weitz raises
the open status of the concept ‘art’, as though to explain what is really
shown by Wittgenstein. However, lacking even citations to Waismann, he
cannot assume without argument Waismann’s confidence in ‘. . . the essential
incompleteness of an empirical description’. Finally, Weitz seems to offer an
especially art-specific reason in addition to those noted above.
The reference to Wittgenstein is considered below (see §V). What should
be made of the others? First, for Weitz:
. . . aesthetic theory is a logically vain attempt to define that which
cannot be defined, to state the necessary and sufficient properties
of that which has no necessary and sufficient properties, to con-
ceive the concept of art as closed when its very use reveals and
demands its openness.59
The essentialist assumption requires that what is common to whatever
(say, art) uniquely identify it: it should provide ‘. . . a common denominator,
so to say, which constitutes the definition of art, and serves to separate . . . the
field of art from other fields of human culture’.60 So, to count as a definition,
conditions both necessary and sufficient are required. Thus necessary con-
ditions for art not jointly yielding a sufficient condition, for example those
urged by Danto (below), would fail to identify an essence for, say, art: they
could not constitute a (genuine) definition.
Here, for Weitz, the open-ness of the concepts explains the lack of defin-
ability, such that:
[a] concept is open if its conditions of application are emendable
and corrigible. . . I can list some cases and some conditions under
which I can correctly apply the concept of art but I cannot list
all of them, for the important reason that unforeseeable or novel
conditions are always forthcoming or envisageable.61
This parallels Waismann’s claims, quoted above, that ‘[v]agueness can be
remedied by giving more accurate rules, open texture cannot . . . definitions
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of open terms are always corrigible and emendable’.62 So open concepts (or
concepts with open texture) are precisely those lacking conditions individually
necessary and jointly sufficient.
For Weitz at least, granting that ‘art’ is an open concept, or a concept
with open texture, contrasts it with closed concepts in mathematics.63 But
why should one accept that art is an open concept? In effect, Weitz offers two
sorts of reasons: one, specific to art, amounts to a positive reason towards
another view:
. . . the very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present
changes and novel creations . . .makes it logically impossible to en-
sure any set of defining properties.64
But (at best) this seems to be about our ensuring, rather than there
being, such properties: a definition unknown to the practice-community (for
art, say) would not alter this point.
The second reason involves Weitz’s use of Wittgenstein’s discussion of
games (at Philosophical Investigations §§66-67), which becomes integrated
into Weitz’s general position because, when asked how the concept art resem-
bles the ‘concept’ game, Weitz replies that ‘. . . the basic resemblance between
these concepts is their open texture’.65 Then:
. . . ‘[i]f one asks what a game is, we pick out sample games and
describe these, and add ‘this and similar things are called ‘games’.’
This is all we need to say and indeed all any of us knows about
games.66
Weitz concludes:
Knowing what a game is (is) not knowing some real definition
or theory but being able to recognize and explain games and to
decide which among imaginary and new examples would or would
not be [‘rightly’?] called games.67
Does this follow from anything Weitz said, or quoted from Wittgenstein?
It would follow that no definition was required in order that one’s claims
be true/false of their intended object, a claim that Kennick extracted from
his warehouse example – that definitions would not be useful to us in these
situations. But, unlike the appeal to (Waismann-ian) open-ness, this posi-
tion is consistent with there being a definition unknown to us – the relevant
concept could still be deployed with confidence and accuracy in a wide va-
riety of circumstances; although, again like the warehouse example, with no
suggestion of always being right. But, insofar as this is a general comment
about concept-mastery, it just reflects the more general difficulty (minimal
anti-essentialism, as explained above). By contrast, the discussion of open
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texture is more specific in claiming open-ness for certain concepts (including
art) while denying it to others.
Both Kennick and Weitz refer to the past failures of aesthetic theorists
to find a factor common to all cases of art, mentioning the classic objections
to definitions – counter-cases that show putative definitions being either too
tight or too loose and/or the circularities indicative of emptiness. But of what
exactly is that evidence? Here, both Kennick and Weitz stress our capacity
to use concepts (especially art) without having a definition: such definitions
form no part of our practice with such concepts. But that alone cannot show
that there are no such definitions, or common factors – and that is one way to
put Mandelbaum’s ‘insight”: namely, that family resemblances are governed
by conditions.
Notice, first, that although Lopes calls the remarks of both Mandelbaum
and Danto ‘. . . responses to anti-essentialism’ (meaning explicitly Kennick and
Weitz), neither is responding to our anti-essentialists: properly understood,
neither set of arguments will undermine the anti-essentialist contention.68
Danto seems simply to attempt to change the topic, while importing the essen-
tialist assumption, while Mandelbaum’s worries about ‘family-resemblance-
concepts’ reflects directly nothing in either paper – although part of the blame
here must fall on those anti-essentialists. Thus, ‘Mandelbaum’s criticisms
of the family resemblance model . . . disclosed a disturbing oversight in the
rhetoric of Weitz and Kennick’69 only if they were deploying these concepts –
definitely not true of Kennick (remember ‘. . . to torture a phrase of Wittgen-
stein’s’),70 and arguably not of Weitz. But, second, the real force of Man-
delbaum’s remarks must await brief consideration of Wittgenstein’s actual
arguments, to which we now turn.
V
These anti-essentialist views are regularly identified as ‘neo-Wittgensteinian’;71
but, at the time, Wittgenstein’s ideas were comparatively newly published.
Since then, the comparative disappearance of Wittgenstein’s ideas from an-
alytic philosophy in general, and philosophical aesthetics in particular, has
meant that arguments (or, at least, examples) from his work are not given due
attention. For example, the notion of ‘family resemblance’ is widely misun-
derstood, in aesthetics as outside it. Confusing presentations by our typical
anti-essentialists, together with misunderstandings (in some cases, or some
places) of what those argumentative strategies could demonstrate, have not
helped here. For, to put it bluntly, Waismann was not Wittgenstein.
The relevant sections of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations are
regularly treated as if independent of his general discussion; and widely mis-
represented, not least as elaborating a newly-discovered logical tool – family-
resemblance-concepts.72 But in these sections, and those following (as well as
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elsewhere), Wittgenstein aims to expose as unjustified just that assumption
that there must be something in common when the same term (say, ‘game’)
is used! For, recognising the ‘. . . craving for a definition’73 as a ‘craving for
generality’,74 Wittgenstein is keen to limit the pretensions of philosophy here
– philosophy’s standards cannot be higher than those used normally: ‘In phi-
losophy . . . we cannot achieve any greater generality than we express in life
and in science’.75 Hence Kennick and Weitz are entitled to the conclusion
that, for concepts such as ‘art’, the absence of a definition from our explana-
tory practices really does permit the setting aside of the need for a definition
(although, naturally, not to conclude that one is impossible).
In PI §66 Wittgenstein famously affirms that games have no common
property; generally he is more circumspect, since his target is only that there
need be none. Once this is granted, the ability to give a definition (in terms of
conditions individually necessary and jointly sufficient) cannot be necessary
for understanding – at least if we do understand games. As Wittgenstein
urged elsewhere, when confronting a counter-case, and noting the absence
in this case of what we naïvely took for a property common to all games, a
commitment to essentialist assumptions may lead us to postulate one – but
one that is difficult to grasp, and awaiting discovery.76 That must be a false
step, if ‘Look and see’ is really the right advice – for one can only ‘look and
see’ what is in plain sight. Here, Wittgenstein requires a property on account
of which the term ‘game’ is rightly applied to all his diffuse examples. In
reality, his dogmatic insistence that there is nothing in common among, say,
games is best seen as the conclusion that, even were some common feature
discovered, it need not define ‘game’ (it might, for instance, play no role in
our explanation of the word ‘game’). Certainly, we are not awaiting such a
discovery.
Further, an example from Wittgenstein makes one element of our practice
clear – that differences among games are recognised contextually:77 hence,
‘[s]omeone says to me: “Shew the children a game”. I teach them gaming with
dice, and the other says “I didn’t mean that sort of game”.’ An exhaustive
account, defining the term ‘game’, is not needed to make good sense of this.
On the other hand, it asks what is involved in, say, ‘not meaning that sort of
game’: when did one mean or not mean whatever? Wittgenstein ponders:
What if one were to ask: ‘When are you able to play chess? Al-
ways? While you are playing it? And during each move?’ — How
strange that being able [knowing how] to play chess should take
such a short time, and a game of chess so much longer!78
In this way, Wittgenstein foregrounds our practices of explaining: what
has no role in such practices cannot be drawn upon to offer an account of
whatever it is.
Moreover, as noted above, Wittgenstein’s target in these sections is the
‘must’ in the assumption that there must be something in common when the
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same term (say, ‘game’) is used: why must there be something in common?
The person asking the question seems unable to think of any other way to
explain using the same word. So Wittgenstein offers an alternative model;
and, since the essentialist had talked in terms of similarities, so does Wittgen-
stein’s alternative proposal. He imagines a rope made of overlapping threads:
Thread A overlaps with thread B, thread B overlaps with thread C, thread
C with D, and so on: threads A and D are part of the same rope but they do
not overlap with one another. So here is an alternative version of ‘unity-in-
difference’, one without essences. If some ‘similarity-based’ explanation must
be offered here, why not this one? And, of course, faced with this alternative,
one cannot insist that it must be this way or that: it could (at least) be either
of these ways.
Since such similarities might be thought to form a family, Wittgenstein of-
fers the term ‘family resemblance’ to characterise this situation. Some writers
have imagined that this constitutes a thesis of Wittgenstein’s: the discovery
of family-resemblance concepts. Such a suggestion does not fit with his use
of the idea.
Those believing in the importance of ‘family-resemblance concepts’ would
expect to find that, having discovered or invented family resemblance, this
notion would loom large in the rest of Wittgenstein’s text. Instead, the term
‘family’ occurs a couple of other times, but only in the ordinary sense: this
idea of ‘family resemblance’ does not recur in Philosophical Investigations.
Why? Because it was only an argumentative strategy against the essentialist
who said, ‘there must be something in common’; and Wittgenstein in effect
replied, ‘If you think of it this way, you will see that the ‘must’ is unjustified’.
First, Wittgenstein has only offered an alternative. Except in his more
dogmatic moments, he has not (yet) even suggested that the essentialist is
wrong in his conclusion about there being something in common in any ac-
tual case, but only shown that the essentialist argument cannot generate the
conclusion that there must be such a common factor. Hence, as Wittgenstein
says, one needs to ‘look and see’ in any particular case. And so, in effect,
here there is a kind of ‘battle of the metaphors’ for being securely grounded:
• Frege (writing about the special case of mathematical concepts) urged
that a concept was like a field; if it was not bounded on all sides, it was
not a field at all.79
• Wittgenstein’s picture of the overlapping threads above: like the essen-
tialist, this offers shared elements, but without guaranteeing that they
will be shared by all cases – the model shows how this assumption might
be avoided.80
• John Wisdom offered the metaphor of a horse: someone might urge
‘there must be something that a horse stands on, that supports it,
otherwise it would fall over’, but Wisdom recognised that a blacksmith
lifts each leg of the horse when shoeing it – without that proving it is
not supported by those legs!81
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And there are many more!82
Second, this emphasis on ‘look and see’, once adopted, also impacts gen-
erally: one can only ‘look and see’ if what is required is in plain sight. But
Wittgenstein recognised that as a requirement on the usefulness of the sup-
posed common element. And this provides his justification for setting aside
(any) definitions unknown to the speaker. Thus, suppose that the putative
definition of ‘sport’ from Bernard Suits indeed offered conditions individually
necessary and jointly sufficient, thereby having an exact fit on the concept
‘sport’: what progress is made?83 Wittgenstein’s thought is that someone who
learned such a definition on Thursday would still have understood sport on
Wednesday: that, in typical cases, our understanding concepts did not (and
could not) await the uncovering of such hidden connections – an implied
criticism both of the project of definition and of its results.
Then, third, notice how Wittgenstein’s account of family resemblances
turns on such ‘looking and seeing’:84 Lord Peter Wimsey is proud of having
inherited the slender, elegant ‘Wimsey hands’, visible in family portraits back
through the ages.85 Yet his brother and sister have not. Of course, there will
be a genetic explanation of all these facts – but being in the (biological)
family does not guarantee one the ‘Wimsey hands’; and they are what might
be noticed here, as Harriett Vane recognises them in Lord St. George, Peter
Wimsey’s nephew.
However Wittgenstein’s view does not lend itself to standard forms of
exposition: what does one write to make plain that certain assumptions are
unjustified, while having no intention of offering alternative assumptions –
or, more exactly, offering alternatives only to undermine the thought that the
initial assumptions must be adopted, that no others are possible? Further,
despite rejecting the ‘. . .misguided craving for exactness’ that Wittgenstein
came to find in his own earlier views, his later philosophy does involve some
generality.86 Very often, questions asked by philosophers ‘. . . can be answered
only by describing quite particular uses of signs, hence only from case to
case’.87 For, at best, one can understand ‘. . . how concepts would apply in, or
to, particular circumstances for which they were designed’,88 where a chain
of examples as ‘objects of comparison’89 is offered in a person-specific and
problem-specific manner, with a therapeutic intent, recognising what Charles
Travis has called ‘occasion sensitivity’.90
VI
So, properly understood, Wittgenstein’s own arguments do undermine the
assumption that there must be something in common to all instances of us-
ing the same word (say, ‘art’) simply by showing that, in any case, other
models might be deployed. More specifically, the considerations raised by
Mandelbaum can be set aside: Wittgenstein never aimed to introduce ‘family-
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resemblance-concepts’ into the philosophical lexicon. Hence it is no criticism
of him that such a notion, if introduced, would be problematic. Further, the
injunction to ‘Look and see!’ is relevant here simply because the essentialist
requires, not just that there be an essence, but that one calls it art because of
the essence – hence that one’s use of the term ‘art’ draw, if implicitly, on this
essence. An unknown (or not yet known) essence will not meet that need.
Our classic anti-essentialism in Kennick and Weitz sometimes requires
only the kind of weaker anti-essentialism mentioned above, the kind really de-
serving the name. Yet sometimes both seem convinced by Waismann’s claims
for the ‘open-ness’ of concepts that ‘art’ cannot be defined: by definition, such
concepts are not amenable to definition. Further, Weitz suggests a special
open-ness for the concept ‘art’, ‘. . . since new cases can always be envisaged
or created by artists . . . ’.91 Of course, when they were writing, Wittgenstein
was not well-understood. Yet the central anti-essentialist thrust remains in
Kennick and Weitz; and most factors mentioned by Carroll need not have
been daunting. Further, the anti-essentialist argument requires that the ab-
sence of an essence should not preclude critical reasoning – both Kennick and
Weitz meet this challenge in ways not undermined by the criticisms of their
papers noted above.
The case of Danto remains to be considered. Strictly speaking, the sug-
gestion that, to meet our requirements, any essence be known, or explicit
enough to explain our practices, counts against both Danto’s initial account
(‘the artistic enfranchisement of these objects’) and his more recent version
(‘embodied meaning . . . [and] wakeful dreams’.92 These conditions, while sug-
gestive of the nature of art, are not candidate elements for definitions. The
pair of necessary conditions that become ‘embodied meaning’ is spelled out so
that ‘[t]o be a work of art is (i) to be about something and (ii) to embody its
meaning’.93 At best, they were only necessary, with the suspicion of circularity
attaching to the notions both of meaning and of embodiment: can they really
be elaborated without becoming, respectively, art-type meaning and art-type
embodiment, especially when their introduction deploys cases from artworks?
Such a suspicion of circularity will attach even more strongly to the idea of
‘wakeful dreams’, especially once Danto insists that ‘[t]he perception [of art]
is shared in a way dreams never are shared . . . ’; so in what sense exactly are
they dreams?94 We may feel unsure whether a non-circular explanation could
be given, since none is provided. Clearly, the expression ‘wakeful dreams’
is evocative; Danto did not live to put much flesh on its bones, except that
aiming at a ‘. . . condition that captures the skill of the artist’ – not, of course,
the skill in manufacture that might be shared with the manufacturer of a
‘confusable counterpart’, but rather as elaborating ‘. . . all the different ways
artists have found to dream-ify’ while granting that this ‘. . . is not possible
to catalogue’.95 I doubt such a condition could be made specific enough to
hunt for candidate counter-cases; and, if not, it cannot really be part of any
account sufficient for art-status.
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The initial idea, that of ‘an atmosphere of theory the eye cannot descry’,96
is also very evocative here: its point, reinforced by the ‘confusable counter-
part’ cases, that it is ‘. . . quite out of the question that one identify the content
of works of art on the basis of their visual properties’.97 But could reference
to such an ‘atmosphere’ identify artworks? In Danto’s ‘confusable counter-
part’ example, ‘. . . a canvas grounded in red lead, upon which, had he lived
to execute it, Giorgione would have painted his unrealised masterpiece ‘Con-
versazione Sacra’ ’ is an object that would have become an artwork, although
presently it is not.98 But why not? Those facts are explained through appeal
to the conditions of the institution of art-production (specifically, of painting-
production) at that time: say, by pointing out that, at the time Giorgione
was painting, (first) canvasses were not prepared in this way and (second) a
square of red paint could not count as an artwork, much less a painting. Us-
ing explanations of roughly this sort grants to this object too (the possibility
of) ‘an atmosphere of theory’ – of course, only to set it aside! Such a connec-
tion to theory is clearly too fragile; not a dense enough atmosphere! Could
the many ways to learn to recognise the appropriate density of atmosphere –
as practitioner, as art historian, or art critics, perhaps as philosopher of art
– each be characterised so as to clarify why the Giorgione canvas is not an
artwork? The difficulty is to imagine a single exceptionless account here, one
that might fail (on another occasion or in a different context) to appropriately
justify the art-status of some other object.
Or consider the fate of the seat of a three-hole ‘outdoor’ toilet that de
Kooning decorated in a style ‘. . . reminiscent of the style used by Jackson
Pollock’.99 This object seems to engage with the artworld as the product of
an artist, resembling other art-objects, surely providing a connection to the
theoretical understanding of art sufficient to meet the condition of ‘an at-
mosphere of theory’. Both de Kooning’s status as an artist and the variety
of objects having found their way (as artworks) into the contemporary art-
world might suggest enough ‘atmosphere’ to enfranchise the three-seater as
an artwork.
But, as Danto recognises, the question But is it art? ‘. . . cannot be asked
of isolated objects’.100 Rather, there is ‘. . . an implicit generalisation in the
question’.101 For one really asks whether things of this kind are artworks.
Of course, by now the Duchamp Fountain is easily recognised as a Ready-
made, one of the class of ‘. . . commonplace objects transfigured into works of
art’: getting one work of a kind (such as this) into the artistic canon in effect
licenses the production of Ready-mades as a legitimate way to intend to make
artworks, although (of course) many will be unpromising artworks!102 Even
had Duchamp in fact stopped at one, the place for (further) Ready-mades
has been prepared – the power of the argument-form, ‘It is art because it
is a Ready-made’ was conceded: the kinds of reasons deployable here have
been recognised as candidate reasons for art-status, although whether good
reasons in any particular example must then be explored case-by-case.
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What of the three-seater? Although ‘[o]bjects similarly to it were to be-
come accepted [as art] in the next generation of artists’, de Kooning did not
develop in this direction; nor would such a development make obvious sense,
given how de Kooning’s development is presently regarded.103 Here Danto
rightly quotes Wölfflin’s slogan:104 ‘Not everything is possible at every time’,
concluding (a) that ‘. . . this particular object can be a work of art only if it
is a de Kooning’;105 but (b) ‘. . . there is no way it can be that’.106 Hence it
is not an artwork, despite the ‘atmosphere of theory’ that seems to surround
it. So agreeing with Danto about this example highlights a limitation in his
claims about conditions necessary for art-status.
Danto rightly recognises that, with the history of art as currently written,
‘. . . there is no space in his [de Kooning’s] corpus for an object of 1954 like
this’.107 Hence substantial re-writing of de Kooning’s corpus, and the trajec-
tory of his art, would be required in order that de Kooning were, after all,
rightly seen as a precursor of (say) Jasper Johns. While not impossible, for
us (as for Danto) it seems improbable. Yet the history of art of a particular
kind (or, picking up Danto’s point, which brings such a kind ‘within the fold’
– as Duchamp did for Ready-mades) is not written once-and-for-all. After all,
the sorts of huge changes in the future of art required to bring it about that,
in 1954, de Kooning might create something precursive of Jasper Johns (or
whomsoever) may not be unimaginable – although we think them unlikely.
But granting this fails to regard these conditions as uncontentiously definitive
of art.
We learn from genuine anti-essentialists (such as Wittgenstein, and per-
haps Kennick) that there is no reason to claim that there must be an essence
for art (or set of conditions individually necessary and jointly sufficient for
deploying the term ‘art’), and that definitions of (say) art are not neces-
sary to our art-theoretic practice: the real outcome of Danto’s institutional
tendencies can be similarly regarded without his essentialist gloss. For the
connection of artworks to art-theory (or art-history more generally conceived)
is an insight. Can it offer genuinely necessary conditions – let alone a suf-
ficient condition – for arthood (as opposed to, say, ones merely defeasibly
necessary)?108 Our discussion of anti-essentialism shows why that question
deserves a negative answer.
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NOTES
1. Originally published 1958; reprinted Ken-
nick 1958.
2. Originally 1956; reprinted many times in-
cluding Weitz 1956.
3. Carroll 2000.
4. Wittgenstein, PI §§66-67; and following.
5. Carroll 2000, 3. Writing prior to the
publication of Philosophical Investigations
(1953) and using the expression ‘family
resemblance’ in broadly this way, Gal-
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lie (1948; reprinted Gallie 1948, 16) at-
tributed it to ‘modern logical theory’; per-
haps adopting the notion derived from the
(then unpublished) Brown Book.
6. Weitz 1956, 52-53.
7. Kennick 1958, 8.
8. Kennick 1958, 7.
9. see Waismann 1945, 41 note
10. In its 1936 version, Waismann’s Prin-
ciples of Linguistic Philosophy included
‘. . . discussion of the ‘open texture of con-
cepts’ . . . ’ (Baker 1997, xvii), later elimi-
nated from the book, although retained in
Waismann’s (1968) paper.
11. Carroll 2000, 3.
12. Danto 1964; reprinted 1989
13. Carroll 2000, 3.
14. Danto 2013, 50-51.
15. Danto 1981, 1.
16. Mandelbaum 1965.
17. Carroll 2000, 12.
18. Carroll 2000, 12.
19. Carroll 2000, 12-13.
20. Dickie 1974 most explicitly.
21. Carroll 2000, 13: my emphasis.
22. Carroll 2000, 4.
23. Kennick 1958, 3.
24. My thanks to the anonymous reviewer
for Aesthetic Investigations who suggested
that this contrast required clarification, as
well as for other helpful suggestions.
25. Kennick 1958, 3.
26. Kennick 1958, 3. Despite Weitz’s insis-
tence on reference to ‘properties’ (‘some
necessary or sufficient property’: Weitz
1956, 48), his criticisms are those regularly
raised against putative definitions: ‘Some
are circular . . . Some of them . . . emphasize
too few properties’ (Weitz 1956, 51) – that
is, they are empty because circular, or sus-
ceptible to counter-examples because ei-
ther too loose or too tight.
27. Bell 1914, 17.
28. Weitz 1956, 49)
29. Kennick 1958, 7.
30. Waismann 1945, 43.
31. Waismann 1945, 42.
32. Weitz 1956, 42.
33. Weitz 1956, 54
34. Weitz 1956, 55.
35. Kennick 1958, 21.
36. Kennick 1958, 21.
37. Kennick 1958, 11.
38. Kennick 1958, 17.
39. Kennick 1958, 10.
40. Weitz 1956, 49.
41. Kennick 1958, 14.
42. Kennick 1958, 15.
43. Weitz 1956, 49.
44. Kennick 1958, 6 and 4.
45. Bell 1914, 17.
46. Kennick 1958, 6.
47. Kennick 1958, 6.
48. Kennick 1958, 6.
49. Kennick 1958, 8.
50. Kennick 1958, 6.
51. Carroll 2000, 3.
52. Kennick 1958, 5.
53. Waismann 1945, 43 and 44.
54. Waismann 1945, 44.
55. Waismann 1945, 44.
56. Waismann 1945, 51 and 44.
57. Waismann 1945, 43. If one had another
reason to accept this idea – say, by drawing
on occasion-sensitivity (Travis, 2008, espe-
cially 150-160) – that, rather than open
texture, would ground one’s claims.
58. Weitz 1956, 49.
59. Weitz 1956, 52.
60. Kennick 1958, 3 quoting De Witt Parker,
as above.
61. Weitz 1956, 54.
62. Waismann 1945, 42.
63. Weitz 1956, 54.
64. Weitz 1956, 55.
65. Weitz 1956, 53.
66. Weitz 1956, 53., quoting Wittgenstein, PI
§69
67. Weitz 1956, 53.
68. Lopes 2014, 108.
69. Carroll 2000, 13
70. Kennick 1958, 8.
71. Carroll 2000, 3.
72. Wittgenstein, PI §§66-67
73. Wittgenstein, BB 27.
74. Wittgenstein, BB 17.
75. Wittgenstein 2004, 57e; Wittgenstein, PG
§77.
76. Wittgenstein, PG §74; Wittgenstein, BB
16-20, 86 f.
77. Wittgenstein, PI between §70 and §71;
Wittgenstein, PG §75.
78. Wittgenstein, BT 114e; Wittgenstein, PG
§12.
79. Frege 1903, vol. II §56: 69.
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80. Wittgenstein’s strategy here does not re-
quire presenting a real alternative.
81. Wisdom 1965, 37.
82. Moreover, notice, as above, that the hard-
est task is showing that things must be one
way – it is easier to tolerate variety.
83. Suits 1995.
84. Wittgenstein, BB 17 talks about ‘family
likenesses’, rather than resemblances . . .
85. Sayers and Cumming 1937, 308-9.
86. Wittgenstein, VoW 319.
87. Wittgenstein, VoW 501.
88. Travis 2008, 14.
89. Wittgenstein, PI §133.
90. Travis 2008. Compare McFee 2015, 23-75.
91. Weitz 1956, 55.
92. Danto 1989, 173, and Danto 2013, 48.
93. Danto 1997, 195 slightly emended.
94. Danto 2013, 51.
95. Danto 2013, 48, 52.
96. Danto 1989, 177.
97. Danto 2000, 134.
98. Danto 1981, 1.
99. Quoted in Danto 1987, 59.
100. Danto 1987, 60.
101. Danto 1987, 60.
102. Danto 1987, 60.
103. Danto 1987, 61.
104. Danto 1987, 61.
105. Danto 1987, 61.
106. Danto 1987, 61.
107. Danto 1987, 61.
108. McFee 2011, 33-34.
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